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The  purpose  of  this  discussion paper  is threefold.  First, I  will  describe  the background  to
Canada's  initiative  in  opening the  trade  liberalization  talks  with  the United  States.  Second,  I
will  present  my  assessment  of the  initiative.  I  argue  that the  initiative  is  unlikely  to  achieve
Canada's  primary  objective  (to restrain  U.S.  protectionsim)  but  may  result  in  other  benefits.
Third, I  will  discuss  an alternative  trade  strategy  for Canada  that  I  argue  will  be  more
successful  in achieving  the primary  objective.
Background
The  latest  initiative  on  trade  liberalization  has  come from  Canada  because  of its  high
vulnerability  in  the  international  market.  Canada  does  not have  a  large  domestic  market  for
its  production  and  so must  rely heavily  on  exports.  Exports  account  for nearly  30  percent  of
Canadian  gross  national  product  (GNP),  compared  with  only about  10  percent  of U.S.  GNP.
Canada  is particularly  concerned  with  access  to  the U.S.  market  because  that  market  accounts
for  between  20  and  80  percent  of the  value  of Canada's  exports.  With  the  heavy  trade  deficit
in  the  United  States  and the  strong  U.S.  dollar,  there  has  been  a  dramatic  rise  in
protectionist  sentiment  in the  United  States which  has  posed  a  serious  threat  to Canadian
access  to this  market.
The  initiative  can  be  traced  back  to  the early  eighties  and  the previous  (Liberal)  government
in Canada.  However,  it was  not until  the present  (Progressive  Conservative)  government  that
the  initiative  became  a  focus  of Canadian  Government  policy.  A  number  of Canadian
industries  were  being  threatened  by  protectionist  lobbies  in  the United  States  (hogs,  softwood
lumber,  paper,  and fish).  In  addition,  the  government  received  a  strong  nudge  toward  trade
liberalization  by  a  1985  report  of a Royal  Commission  on the  Canadian  economy  (the
MacDonald  report).  The  report  urged  Canada  to  take a  "leap  of faith"  and  open  freer trade
negotiations  with  the  United  States.  The  benefits  of freer  trade  were  seen  as:  (a)  protecting
Canada's  access  to  the  huge  U.S.  market,  (b)  encouraging  Canadian  industry  to  become  more
efficient,  and  (c)  discouraging  Canadian  firms  from  relocating  in  the  United  States  (to gain
access  to  that market  without  worrying  about  trade  barriers).  The  government  took  the  "leap
of  faith" in early  1985  and  made  overtures  to  the  United  States administration  about  trade
liberalization.  At  a summit  between  the leaders  of the  United  States and  Canada  in  March
1985,  the  President  and  Prime  Minister  agreed  to  examine  ways  to  reduce  or  eliminate  trade
barriers  between  the two  countries.
Since  then,  Canada  has  invested  considerable  resources  in preparing  for the  negotiations.  In
addition,  there  has  been  wide  and  prolonged  debate  in  the  Canadian  media  on the  pros  and
cons  of  a trade  liberalization  agreement  (TLA).  By  contrast,  on the  U.S.  side,  there  has  been
little  interest  in the  trade  liberalization  talks.  Nonetheless,  the talks  on  a comprehensive  TLA
are  continuing  with  the  following  items,  the main  ones  being  discussed:
(1)  the elimination  of  technical  barriers to  trade (for  example,  health regulations);
(2)  the elimination  of  trade-distorting subsidies;
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(4)  exemption  from or modification  to contingency  protection  laws  (countervail  and
antidump);
(5)  greater  access  to government  procurement  contracts;
(6)  freer access  to services  markets;  and
(7)  transitional  policies  (that  is,  assistance  to industries  that are  forced  to  adjust).
Canada  is  particularly  interested  in  (4)  and  (7),  while  the  United  States  is  more  interested  in
(5) and  (6).
Assessment  of  the Initiative
Canada's  primary  objective  in  pursuing  this initiative  was  to  gain  relief  for Canadian  exporters
from the  increasing  protectionist  pressure  being  applied  by  U.S.  special  interests  under  U.S.
trade  remedy  laws (countervail,  antidump,  and  safeguard).  The Canadian  Government  thus
went  into the  negotiations  thinkings  that  a  TLA  would be  an  effective  way  to  restrain
(discipline)  U.S.  protectionists.  However,  what  the government  and  the rest of  the  country
are beginning  to  realize  is that  the country  with  the  biggest stick  carries  out  most of the
discipline.  The  main  reasons  why  Canada appears  to  be  in a  poor  bargaining  position are  as
follows.
(1)  Protectionism  is  very  strong  in the  United  States at  present.  This  is  reflected  in the
attribute of Congress  which  has  over  the  years  gained  ever-greater  power  over  the
determination  of trade  policy  from  the  Administration.  The trend  to greater  U.S.
protectionism  is linked  to the  strong  U.S.  dollar  and  burgeoning  trade  deficit.  It may  also  be
linked  to the  increasing  awareness  of  and  skill  in  using  the  U.S.  trade  remedy  laws.
(2)  The  Canadian  Government  adopted  a high  profile  in its  search  for  a  TLA  with  the  United
States.  The  achievement  of a TLA  was  made a cornerstone  of the  government's  economic
platform.  This  placed  considerable  added pressure  on  the Canadian  negotiators  to  reach  an
agreement,  and  hence  weakened  their bargaining  position.  To  his credit,  the  Prime  Minister
appears  to have  been  backing  away  from  this  position  in  recent  months.  Hence,  this  may  be
less  of a factor  now.
(3)  Canada  is  relatively  far  more dependent  on  the  United States  for  trade  than  the  United
States  is  dependent  on  Canada.
If a comprehensive  TLA  were  negotiated,  the outcome  would  reflect  a situation  in  which  the
United States  disciplines  Canada  with  respect  to  its  subsidies  and  distortions  but there  is little
scope  for  Canada disciplining  the  Unites  States  with  respect  to  its subsidies  and  distortions.
Hence,  a  comprehensive  TLA  will  not  be  very successful  in  achieving  the  primary  objective  of
the Canadian  Government.
A  possible  secondary  objective  is more  likely  to  be  realized  by  a TLA.  This  objective  is  to
encourage  Canadian  business  to be  more  internationally  competitive,  which  would  be  good  for
Canadian  consumers  and taxpayers.  Since  we  have  already argued  that  the  main effect of  a
TLA  is  that the  United States  would  be better  able  to discipline  Canadian  business  with
respect  to subsidies  and  distortions,  it follows  that Canadian  business  would  be subjected  more
directly  to  the principle  of "survival of the  fittest."  Even  without  such an agreement,  the
rising  tide  of U.S.  protectionism  and  the application  of  U.S.  trade  remedy  laws  are
encouraging  a  rethinking  in Canada  of the  use  of subsidies  in  export-oriented  industries.  The
advantage  of a comprehensive  TLA  is that  it will encourage  this kind of  rethinking  in  a
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rethinking  might  be  expected  in those  domestically  oriented  industries  that  would  face
potential competition  from the  United  States  under  a TLA.
One  major  spinoff benefit  of  the TLA  negotiation  process  is that  it has  been  a  valuable
exercise  leading  up  to  Canada's  participation  in GATT.  There  has  been  an unusually
wide-ranging  debate  over  trade  issues  that should  prove  very useful  to  developing  Canada's
position  at GATT.  This  debate  has  included  input  from  all  sectors  of Canadian  society:  from
various  industry  groups,  labor groups,  and  the  provinces,  as  well  as  many  other  special
interest  groups.  In  addition,  many staffers  assigned  to  work  on  the bilateral  trade  initiatve
are  also  working  on the  GATT  negotiations  and  they  should  benefit  from  the  overlap  between
the  two.
Thus,  there  appear  to  be  some  gains  from  a comprehensive  TLA  even  if they  come  more  from
a secondary  objective  and  a  spinoff benefit rather  than from  the primary  objective.  However,
despite  these  potential  gains,  the probability  of  success  appears  to  be  low.
Most  experts  agree  that  it  is very  doubtful  that a  comprehensive  TLA  will  be  achieved  with
the present  Republican  administration.  And  if the  next administration  is led  by  a  Democrat,  it
has  been  suggested  that  the negotiations  will  be  even  more difficult  for  Canada  (because
Democrats are  thought  to  be  more  protectionist).  The  reason  for doubt  is  the  inherent
complexity  of such an  agreement  as  well  as  the  very  tight timetable  for reaching  agreement
during the  present  U.S.  administration.  The complexity  arises  in  Canada  because  it  would
involve tradeoffs  in  which some  industries  and  regions  or  provinces  would  gain,  while  others
would  lose.  The  problem  for  the Canadian  Government  is  that it not only  has  to negotiate
with the  U.S.  Government  but  also with  special  interest  groups  and  provincial  governments
within Canada.  For  example,  many  agricultural  marketing  boards  and  subsidy  programs  are
subject  to provincial  or joint federal-provincial  jurisdiction.
The deadline  for  achieving  an agreement  with  the present  administration  is October  1987.
This  is necessary  in order  to gain  approval  from  Congress  under  the "fast track"  mechanism
which expires  January  3,  1988.  Failure  to  achieve  this deadline  would  almost certainly  mean
failure  to  achieve  acceptance  under  the current  presidency.  Added  to  the  time  difficulties
may  be  the  recent  change  in structure  of the  Senate  Finance  Committee  and Congress  in
general  to domination  by  the  Democrats.
While  the negotiators  in Ottawa are  still focusing  their attention  on  the  idea of  a
comprehensive  agreement,  there  is  now  some  talk  of a 'fall-back'  position if and  when  the
comprehensive  agreement  fails  to  materialize.  A  fall-back  position  may include  an  attempt  to
get some  bilateral  commission  to  address  trade  irritants  (for example,  technical  barriers  such
as health  regulations  and  customs  inspection  procedures).  A  paper  by  Bruce  and  Kerr
(discussed  in the  next  session)  outlines  a  proposal  for such  a commission  for livestock  and
livestock  products.  I  suspect  that such  a  commission  would  not  be  too  difficult  to  negotiate
in the  limited  time  available.  However,  it  seems  unlikely  that  it  would  be  given any  real
power by either  side to  settle trade  disputes.  Its  role  would  likely  be  limited to  providing  an
extra channel  of communication  between  the  two  sides.  This  may  be  useful  as  a safety  valve
and  as  a  way  of allowing  the  two  sides  to  settle disputes  and  irritants  rather than  going
through  the  countervail  process.
An  Alernative  Trade  Strategy?
I  have  argued  that  this initiative  is  useful  in encouraging  Canadian  business  to  be  more
internationally  competitive,  but  it will  not be  very  successful  in  restraining  U.S.  protectionism.
The  question  is:  is  there  another strategy  that would  have  a  greater  chance  of success  in
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building  up its bargaining  power  vis-a-vis  the  United States.  This  may  be  done  through:
(1)  building  a consensus  within Canada  (between the  federal  and  provincial  governments,
labor  and  industry)  so that  Canada speaks  with  a unified  voice;
(2)  building  coalitions  with  groups  outside  Canada  (in  the  United  States  and elsewhere)
who  are  expected  also  to  be adversely  affected  by  U.S.  protectionism;  and
(3)  lobbying  in the  various  forums  of power  to  alter the  rules  of the  game  so  they are
less  in favor of  the  U.S.  protectionists.  The  most important  forums of  power  are  in
the  United  States  (the Congress,  the Administration,  State  legislatures)  and  the
most important  groups  with  which to form  coalitions  are  those  inside  the  United
States  (processors,  marketers,  and  consumers  of the  imported  products,  as  well  as
taxpayers).  However,  there  are forums of  power  outside  the  United  States  (GATT)
and  here  Canada  may attempt  to  impose  disciplines  on  U.S.  protectionists  by  forming
coalitions  with  other  adversely  affected  countries.
The  idea  that Canada  should  get involved  in lobbying  and  coalition-building  is  not  a  new  one.
In  fact,  it  was  the  strategy  adopted  by  Canada  in  1983  and  which  worked  so  well  in the  1983
softwood  lumber  case.  However,  it  seems  to have  been  pushed  aside  by  the  thrust  of the
bilateral  trade  negotiations.
With  respect  to  agricultural  commodities  (especially  grains),  I  think  Australia  provides  perhaps
the  clearest  example  of where  this strategy  is  currently  being  embraced.  Here  the emphasis
has  been  on  reducing  protectionism  in the  European  Community  (EC)  and  the  United  States.
Last  year,  Australia's  Bureau  of Agricultural  Economics  (BAE)  completed  a  well-publicized
study of  the agricultural  policies  of the  EC.  One  factor  that sets  this  study apart  was  the
emphasis  given by  the  BAE on  publicizing  the  results  inside  the EC  itself.  This  suggests  that
the  study's main objective  was  to  develop  coalitions  within  the EC  (consumers  and  the  labor
force)  by pointing  out the  heavy  cost  to them of  the common  agricultural  policy  (CAP).  It  is
interesting  to  note  that the  BAE recently  embarked  on  a similar  exercise  looking  at  U.S.
agricultural  policies.  And  the emphasis  is  expected  to  be  on  the  cost of these  policies  to
groups  within  the United  States  (taxpayers).  In another  initiative,  the  Australian  Government
recently  organized  a ministerial  meeting  of "fair traders  in agriculture."  The participants  were
from  14  countries  not  including  the  United  States,  EC,  or  Japan.  The Australians  saw  the
main objective  of the  meeting  to  enable  "an important  group  of countries  to increase  their
collective  negotiating  leverage"  at GATT.  Australia  was,  in effect,  attempting  to  build  a
coalition  of  agricultural  exporting  countries  at  the  GATT  forum  to  address  the  problem  of
agricultural  protectionism  in the  United  States,  EC,  and  Japan.
With  respect  to  the secondary  objective  the  question  is:  does Canada  need  a TLA  to  achieve
greater  discipline  of its  domestic  industry?  Certainly  the current  U.S.  trade  remedy  laws  are
having  some  effect,  and  pressures  from  other countries  (through GATT)  will  have  some  effect.
A strong  Canadian  Government  could  also  play  a part  in  imposing greater  discipline on
domestic  industry.  The  problem  of course  is  that unilateral  actions  to reduce  protection  are
very unpopular  and  can expect strong  resistance  from  the  provinces  and special  interests.  I
would say  that  the advantage  of a TLA  over  the current  application  of U.S.  trade  remedy  laws
is that the  discipline  imposed  on Canadian  business  would  be  more  broadly  based  and less
capricious.
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